Abstract: Quantum cryptography, a field of science that had not been known before, developed rapidly in the late 20th century. It originated from a combination of quantum mechanics and information technology. The present paper presents the possibilities of using quantum mechanics in cryptography and considers whether there are any practical solutions to the important class of problems regarding the security of transmitted information.
Introduction
The late 20th century was marked with a rapid development of information technologies. This has resulted in the modern business and industry being no longer able to function properly unless supported by solutions offered by the omnipresent information technology. Information technology is what pushes the environment towards constant and numerous transformations. Information is nowadays the most important asset. Fast and seemingly secure exchange of information has given rise to a "new world" -a world of information. This, however, entails various hazards and high risk of misuse or abuse. The issue of security of transferring and storing of electronic information poses the biggest problem, which makes quantum information and cryptography grow in importance. These two fields integrate two scientific fields, i.e. information technology and quantum mechanics. Peter W. Shor's algorithm, published in 1994, together with the idea of quantum computation demonstrated that secure transfer of information could soon be possible only with quantum protocols based on the principles of quantum mechanics, where security is based on the laws that govern the microscope world rather than on time-consuming calculations. Information based on quantum mechanics can be "fully secure" provided certain conditions are met. However, its credibility still remains an issue.
This article presents the basic concepts of quantum information and cryptography. It also discusses the issue of security in quantum cryptography based on the laws of quantum mechanics, as well as the issue of information credibility.
The basic concepts and properties of quantum mechanics
Unlike traditional cryptography, quantum cryptography is based on theoretical principles and laws of quantum mechanics. An exhaustive description of concepts regarding quantum mechanics, quantum cryptography and quantum information can be found in numerous sources [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . The present paper refers to and discusses just the basic features and concepts.
In quantum cryptography the traditional bit described through the Boolean algebra is substituted with a quantum bit -"qubit". Qubit, defined as a quantum system described by the two-dimensional Hilbert space [3] , is the smallest, indivisible and elementary bit of quantum information. Unlike the traditional bit that takes only two values -either 0 or 1 -qubit can not only represent the two conditions of |0 or|1 but also any of their superpositions ϕ = α |1 + β |0 .
From the mathematic point of view the above problem can be put as follows [3] , [5] : Two orthogonal qubit states can be notated as |0 and |1 . In Dirac notation |0 = 1 0 , |1 = 0 1 . When these states are seen as vectors {|0 = 1 0 , |1 = 0 1 } they form an orthonormal basis. If H 2 is a two-dimensional Hilbert space over a field of complex numbers C 2 with an orthonormal basis {|0 , |1 }, a qubit is represented by a normalized vector in this space: |ϕ = α |0 + β |1 , where α 2 + β 2 = 1; α, β ∈ C, which means that after an operation such as e.g. quantum bit measurement it will find itself in the state of |0 with the probability of |α| 2 and in the state of |1 with the probability of |β| 2 . α and β are called (vector) state amplitudes. Therefore, any qubit state is described by a linear combination of base vectors.
Quantum systems made up of two qubits are commonly described using tensor product. One of the basic and fundamental principles of quantum mechanics states that the state space for 2 qubits is represented by the tensor product of single qubits quantum state spaces [3] .
A system of n-qubits makes up a 2 n -complex Hilbert space H 2 n which is the tensor product in the H 2 space [1], [3] .
The quantum state space for n-qubits has 2 n mutually orthogonal quantum states {|i }, where i is an n-bit binary number and i= 1,2,. . . ..2 n -1.
As has been mentioned above, qubit is the basic unit of quantum information, i.e. of information contained in the quantum system state (for physical systems whose properties are described by quantum physics). Quantum information means a state of an object in a quantum sense (e.g. the state of a particle is described by its wave function) which is unobservable for classic objects, and which communicates with other systems in a quantum way. Quantum information is processed in a way that is unreadable to a classic observer. When measuring quantum systems a "classic observer" can read "classic information" contained therein. However, this is possible only to a little degree given the whole content of quantum information contained in the system concerned. Uncertainty principle is the barrier as any measurement of one value disturbs the quantum state in such a way that it becomes impossible to measure another value. Quantum systems have enormous capacities. The capacities grow expotentially with the number of particles, whereas classic information which is readable for a classic observer grows with the number of particles only in a linear way (just like in the classic information technology).
Quantum entanglement -apart from the states of |00 , |01 , |10 , |11 , which have their traditional equivalents, a superposition of α |00 + β |11 is also possible. This state is called an entanglement. Its exhaustive description can be found in [1] , [3] , [5] , [10] , [11] . This state fundamental for quantum computers, for more effective information transfer, i.e. for dense encoding, teleportation or finally for secure transmission of information in quantum networks. Albert Einstein, Borys Podolsky and Nathan Rosen in their work [12] have shown that the postulates of quantum mechanics imply the existence of a unique state of two objects:
. This superposition means that one qubit is in the state of |0 and the other in the state of |1 , and at the same time the former qubit is in the state of |1 and the latter in |0 . Entanglement results from the tensor product of two-dimensional vectors that represent particular qubits. However, the properties of the tensor product imply that the tensor product vector is not enough to unambiguously calculate vectors which form particular factors of the product. Only orthonormal base vectors are an exception. Entanglement cannot be determined as each measurement changes its state.
Bell states, also known as EPR states or EPR pairs, are the most popular examples of entanglement. The significance of the Bell basis -the quantum entanglement basisin quantum information is enormous. It is an orthonormal basis created by four mutually orthogonal base vectors in the C 4 space, whose amplitude values are equal.
This results in the so called maximum entanglement:
Each of the above vectors describes an entanglement of two qubits [3] .
No-cloning and uncertainty principle are very important properties of quantum computation. They are used in quantum protocols and differentiate quantum computation from traditional information technology.
No-cloning: The laws of quantum mechanics do not permit copying unknown states (though a true copy of an unknown state can be sent over a distance through a quantum channel). There are no ideal copies of unknown quantum states. This is one of the most fundamental theorems of quantum mechanics. An exhaustive description of this principle can be found in [5] , [13] .
Uncertainty principle, discovered and formulated in 1927 by Werner Heisenberg, states that certain pairs of values cannot both be known to arbitrary precision. That is, measurement of one of the properties affects the system in such a way that part of information concerning the other value is lost. The uncertainty principle results from the nature of reality itself rather than form an imperfection of measuring methods or tools. The principle is a consequence of the wave-particle duality. An exhaustive description of this property can be found in [5] , [14] .
To sum up, the principle refers to the measurement of complementary properties, where single properties can be measured with any precision, though an accurate measurement of one property disturbs the other and results in obtaining accidental values while measuring the other. Position and momentum as well as light polarization in rectilinear and diagonal bases are examples of such properties.
One last issue that needs to be mentioned in this chapter is the disadvantageous phenomenon of decoherence.
Quantum decoherence is a process that causes uncontrolled entanglement of a quantum system with its environment, i.e. results in a mixed "system plus environment" state. The state of such a system ceases to be fully certain [11] . Decoherence can significantly weaken or even destroy controlled entanglement used in quantum information. Quantum decoherence can be therefore be viewed as a loss of information about a system resulting from its interaction with the environment. It is a considerable obstacle in building "multicubit" quantum computers as information grows expotentially with the number of qubits.
The issue of security in quantum cryptography in selected protocols
The present chapter presents selected quantum protocols divided into the protocols that do not involve entanglement, and those that are based on entanglement.
Quantum key distribution without entanglement
This chapter describes two quantum protocols, whose theoretical bases involve the uncertainty principle and no-cloning. In his article on Conjugate Coding published in 1970, Stephen Wiesner demonstrated that cryptography combined with quantum mechanics solves two principal problems regarding confidentiality. One is the issue of creating an unforgeable banknote; the other is combining two classical messages into one transmission where the receiver can read only one of the messages. The idea described by Wiesner gave rise to the concept described in 1982 by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard. It made possible detection and even elimination of eavesdropping along transmission links, as well as message transmission via fully secure channels. Thus, security results from the certainty of eavesdropping detection [15] .
Information is sent by means of photons. Quantum protocols use light polarization. Rectilinear and diagonal polarizations make a pair of complementary properties that are subject to the uncertainty principle. The usual polarizers are birefringent crystals, e.g. calcite (Iceland spar). While falling on the crystal, a light ray is subject to double refraction and divided into two rays that refract at various angles. The two rays are called ordinary and extraordinary rays. Both are polarized, though in mutually perpendicular planes. When measuring polarization with a filter, we measure light intensity (amplitude) in the direction that the filter lets it trough [15] . Where a single polarized photon (light quantum, light wave carrier) falls on such a filter, the concept of "intensity" becomes the concept of "probability" with the following possible configurations: a vertically polarized photon 90 • goes through a vertical polarizer 90 • with a probability of 1 a horizontally polarized photon 0 • goes through a vertical polarizer with a probability of 0 a diagonally polarized photon 45 • (135 • ) goes through a vertical polarizer and takes a vertical position of 90 • or a horizontal position of 0 • with a probability of 1/2.
Where Iceland spar, as natural polarizer, and two photon detectors that register photons from the ordinary and extraordinary light beams, are used for the experiment, two photon polarizations can be recorded: 0 • and 90 • . This crystal position determines the so called rectilinear basis.
In order to measure diagonal polarization, the crystal axis is turned by 45 • and the polarization obtained is 45 • and 135 • . This crystal position determines the diagonal basis.
It follows from the uncertainty principle that measurements in rectilinear (diagonal) bases provide no information concerning diagonal (rectilinear) polarization [16] . Polarizations are two physical values that -in accordance with the laws of quantum mechanics -are not co-measurable. Any measurement of one of them makes the other totally indeterminate, and therefore passive eavesdropping is not possible at the quantum level, as the eavesdropper changes the state of the disturbed system. In other words, each attempt at eavesdropping distorts the message. This ensures security while agreeing on the cryptographic key. • we obtain a device for diagonal polarization [16] Input Output Thanks to the aforesaid phenomenon we can develop two quantum alphabets that are obtained from two perpendicular polarizations with the traditional 0 and 1 values. In this way information can be encoded and transferred via a quantum channel. The secure quantum protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84) is based on the aforesaid idea [17] . The protocol description can also be found in [1] , [5] , [18] .
The protocol is based on two channels, i.e. on private and classical public channels, and is divided into two stages, i.e. quantum key distribution and classical coding. The most important stage is to determine the quantum key. BB84 protocol stages [18] : cryptographic key distribution.
1. Quantum communication stage a. Alice chooses randomly one of the two bases and one of the two orthogonal polarizations in the selected base, which means a selection of one of four possible po-larizations. She sends Bob a photon with the selected polarization. According to the relevant alphabets this means a sequence of zeros or unities that corresponds to the selected polarizations.
b. Bob chooses randomly a rectilinear or diagonal base and measures the polarization of the photon that he received from Alice.
c. Bob records the results and keeps them confidential. 2. Public communication stage a. Bob publicly announces to Alice which base he used to measure the polarization of the photon that he received from Alice. Alice tells him whether this was the right base or not.
b. Alice and Bob store the results for which Bob has used the right base. c. By attributing the binary values of 0 and 1 to those results according to the relevant alphabets, both Alice and Bob obtain the same (random) sequence of zeros and unities that can be used as a cryptographic key. -Eve eavesdrops and measures a randomly chosen basis. Once she records the polarization, she sends the same photon to Bob -Eve changes bits and introduces errors to the transmission, which is evident in the last bit -Alice and Bob can detect Eve's presence by comparing randomly selected part of bits from the accepted key. Then they delete the bits.
-If it turns out that the bits have been changed, then somebody has eavesdropped. The key needs to be agreed on anew.
Therefore, the protocol can ensure security in the following ways:
-Eve has no information regarding the way bit values are attributed to polarization.
-Eve cannot clone information, unless she knows the state of the carrier -Each measurement is an integral part of the system concerned -it is not possible to eavesdrop. Monitoring disturbs the quantum information.
As already mentioned, it is the unique properties of the quantum information, i.e. no-cloning and the uncertainty principle, that make quantum information fully secure (unlike classical information) provided certain additional conditions are met. According to the classical cryptography, correctly used one-time pad is unbreakable. In this method, the key is chosen randomly and used only once. Its length is equal to the length of the text. The conclusion is obvious: if the quantum key distribution is combined with the classical one-time pad, the resulting transmission channel is fully secure.
The B92 protocol
The B92 protocol, whose name is derived from the name of its inventor, Charles Bennett, and the year of invention (1992), is based on a similar principle. It was described in the article Quantum Cryptography Using any Two Nonorthogonal States [19] , as well as in the following papers [1] , [5] . This key exchange protocol has been based on two nonorthogonal quantum states.
The following is considered a pair of nonorthogonal states{|→ , | }. Their respective orthogonal states are {|↑ , | }, and these are the states for which measurements are taken.
The quantum alphabet in B92 protocol 0
• horizontal polarization 0 b. Alice and Bob save the bit sequence, for which Bob has recorded the photon. The sequence is the encoding key. Like in the BB84 protocol, in the B92 protocol eavesdropping results in key errors that can be detected by the sender and receiver.
However, in the B92 protocol there is no need to compare measurement bases, as the receiver knows the final sequence of shared bites and tells the sender which positions should be rejected.
Quantum key distribution that uses entanglement
This group includes cryptosystems based on entanglement. Quantum entanglement is known as a correlation between subsystems, where the measurement of one subsystem has immediate effect on the other subsystems. In addition, the state has no classical equivalents and does not disappear with distance. Quantum entanglement is the basis of the famous EPR paradox.
The E91 protocol
The most important protocol is the EPR protocol whose author, Artur Ekert, used this abbreviation in honour of the famous paradox of Einstein, Podolski and Rosen [12] which underlies the phenomenon of entanglement. This protocol is also known as E91 after the name of the author and the year in which it was described in the article Quantum Cryptography Based on Bell's Theorem [20] . This protocol, just like the protocols of BB84 and B92 discussed earlier, is based on the creation and detection of quantum states. Photon polarizations are measured in rectilinear or diagonal bases. The protocol is based on quantum entanglement.
The E91 protocol stages [21] [22]: cryptographic key distribution.
Quantum communication stage
Pairs of maximum entangled photons are generated from an entanglement source independent of Alice or Bob:
In this way Alice and Bob each obtain one photon from the entangled pair. They set their modulators (wave plates) randomly for the measurement of polarization in the rectilinear or diagonal bases.
By measuring the polarization of her photon Alice affects the quantum state of Bob's photon. Alice records her results. The measurement of Alice's spin permits her to obtain information on Bob's spin immediately, regardless of the distance between them. If Alice obtains the result of 1 / 2 , then Bob's result must be -1 / 2 .
Bob measures the quantum state of his photon and records the results.
If Alice and Bob both measure linear polarizations, they will always record orthogonal polarizations. If they choose to measure diagonal polarizations, they will always record opposite helicities. Fig. 3 . Quantum key distribution in the EPR protocol
is an entanglement, it can be used to observe breaking Bells' inequalities [17] , [23] .
Public communication stage
Once the photon transmission is complete, Bob has the original code (raw key) that contains approx. 25% of errors and contacts Alice.
Alice and Bob publicly announce the detector orientations they have selected for each measurement, and divide their measurements into two groups.
One group contains results obtained using different detector orientations. The other contains results obtained using compatible orientations. Then they reject all measurements for which one or both of them have recorded no particles.
Alice and Bob publicly announce the results obtained in the first group (exchange parts of their keys) in order to check whether the resulting state breaks Bell's inequality. If it does, they can be sure that there has been no eavesdropping. This means being sure that the results from the other group are in opposite correlation and can be used for defining a secret shared key.
Alice and Bob remove the measurements in which modulators have been set otherwise.
Alice performs negation of the other measurements and obtains a key that is identical to Bob's.
The shifted key contains a sequence of bits for which gates chosen by Alice and Bob have been compatible (approx. 50%) Therefore, the protocol ensures security in two ways:
-In this protocol the eavesdropper is not able to obtain any information from particles during transmission because they carry no information. The information that defines the key occurs only after measurement performed by the sender and receiver, and after their public communication.
-Each attempt at eavesdropping results in weakening correlation, which makes it susceptible to detection by sender and receiver.
-Each measurement is an integral part of the system concerned -eavesdropping is not possible.
-Monitoring interferes with the quantum information.
Authentication
Reliable authentication is indispensable in many daily activities. Ensuring security in quantum cryptography is possible, yet reliability (authentication) is not so evident. Authentication means proving identity. Authentication means the process or mechanism of identification or verification of identity of a device, program or user [5] . Authentication is a process that consists in verifying the declared identity of a person, device or service that participates in data exchange. The definition of "authentication" can be found in the basic cryptographic standard of: ISO/IEC CD 9798-1, to which authentication algorithms refer. Authentication is not a new issue. The methods and ways of authenticating are discussed below.
Information systems employ three ways of authentication:
-One-way authentication -authentication of one authenticating entity towards another e.g. application client, server.
-Two-way authentication -sequential or simultaneous (one-step) authentication of both entities, e.g. client -server, server -client.
-Authentication with the participation of a trusted third party -a trusted third party is admitted into the process and entrusted with the verification of authenticating data of the authenticated entity. Upon positive verification the authenticated entity receives confirmation that is then presented to the manager of the desired resource.
At present there are three methods for authentication of entities [5] The most popular classical methods for authentication are based on asymmetric cryptography, one-time passwords, tokens, and on human biometrics such as fingerprints, palm shapes, iris characteristics, which are scanned and compared with the database resources.
The classical methods based on Property and Knowledge are not truly secure, as passwords can be cracked and equipment can be stolen.
Methods based on asymmetric cryptography, particularly the ones that are based on the RSA algorithm, are sufficiently secure today. RSA is one of the most important and most frequently used asymmetric algorithms. Its name stems from the names of its authors i.e. Ronald Rives, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. Developed in 1977, RSA is a power cipher based on the integer factorization problem. It can use keys of any length. RSA is the most widely spread public key algorithm used both for data coding and for generating electronic signatures. The system can be used not only for confidential data exchange, but also for implementing electronic signature techniques. RSA'a security is based on the integer factorization problem [25] , [26] . However, in 1994 Shor developed an algorithm of large number factorization using quantum computers. With a quantum computer it would be possible to crack a 1024-bit key in just minutes [15] , therefore algorithms based on asymmetric keys would cease to be secure.
The future of authentication is therefore determined by the use of biometrics. Biometrics is a way of using intrinsic physical or behavioural traits for identification or verification of identity [1] . Biometrics employs two authentication methods:
Verification -based on a unique identifier that distinguishes particular person, and on the person's biometrics. It is a combination of authentication methods. During verification users present their name tags and biometrics.
Identification -based only on biometrics. Identification consists in comparing measurement results with particular register or database.
Biometrics can be divided into two groups depending on the features used for authentication, namely [1] :
Physiological biometrics such as face, fingerprints, palm geometry, iris, DNA, ear shape, odour, retina, skin glow, thermogram
Behavioural biometrics such as signature, voice, walk, writing pace, lip movement The most popular biometrics include: face, fingerprints, palm geometry, iris, signature, voice.
Regardless of whether they are based on physiological or anatomic features, biometrics should meet the following criteria:
Universality -the feature should be common for humans, Individuality -the feature should differentiate individuals sufficiently, Durability -the feature should remain durable regardless of the lapse of time or individual's wellbeing, Measurability -the feature should be measurable, Acceptability -the feature (method) should be socially acceptable. Combination of the aforesaid attributes determines the effectiveness of specific biometrics. Each of the said methods satisfies given criteria to a certain degree (L -low, M -medium, H -high) [1] , [5] : universality individuality durability measurability acceptability
Tab 9. Biometric methods -degrees to which given criteria are met It follows from the table above that there is no ideal biometric method that would truly satisfy all the above criteria at the same time.
DNA provides very good biometrics, too [24] , as it codes digital information concerning identity. However, the disadvantage is that monozygotic twins have identical DNA. In addition, comparing identity by means of DNA samples is a time-consuming, slow and complicated process. What is more, the method has very low acceptability. It also codes information that could be used for processes other than identification, i.e. information concerning disease, race, origin.
Summary
The article discusses the basic concepts regarding information technology and quantum cryptography. It also discusses the issue of ensuring security in quantum cryptography based on the laws of quantum mechanics.
Unlike classical protocols whose security is based on time-consuming calculations, the quantum protocols presented in the article act based on the laws of quantum mechanics and it is these laws that determine their security. Security is therefore ensured in a natural way by the laws that govern micro-world.
Peter W. Shor's algorithm published in 1994, together with the idea of creating a quantum computer proved that even asymmetric algorithms might soon become insecure.
Bits that are generated randomly during quantum key distribution and that are free from eavesdropping can in the BB84, B92 and E91 protocols be subsequently used as a cryptographic key to the unbreakable symmetric one-time pad. The resulting key is unconditionally secure and unbreakable even to persons who have the best technology and unlimited computing powers at their disposal. Here information security is secured by fundamental physical laws rather than by mathematic complexity of calculations. Information transmitted by means of such protocols is secure as long as the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics are not disproven.
In terms of practical implementation, the first transmission using quantum protocols from the first group was effected in 1989 by sending quantum bits over a distance of 32 cm by air. In 2004 an American company of MagiQ and a Swiss company of ID Quantique first marketed equipment for quantum cryptography. In April 2004 two Austrian institutions made the first electronic transfer of funds using entangled photons.
Although practical implementation of protocols is now limited by qubit stability (as quantum states are easily disturbed), quantum cryptography ceases to be a solely theoretical science. Government institutions, banks, companies will soon use such systems to transmit classified information. The government of the Canton of Geneva is even considering using the ID Quantique product for electronic voting.
Still there is no ideal authentication system that would prove identity in absolute terms, as has been said in the chapter on authentication methods.
It might seem that combining quantum cryptography as a method for ensuring information security (ensuring secrecy) with the DNA biometric method (proving identity) that is highly common and individual could result in an improved security of information.
DNA biometrics code digital information concerning identity contained in a cell. So far this method has been used in forensic medicine. Its most considerable disadvantage is the fact that monozygotic twins have identical DNA. It is also a very expensive, complicated and slow method. Quantum cryptography and DNA biometrics can be combined by following for instance the procedure of determining and verifying digital signature. Here the digital signature would be substituted with a DNA signature which is individual for each man (except for monozygotic twins), and coded in the digital form. The DNA signature attached to a message that Alice is to send to Bob would guarantee that the text of the message is not modified and, what is most important, it would authenticate the author. Such message would be sent via a fully secure channel that rules out eavesdropping.
